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International Law And Community

Treaty-Making Power
Hans van Houtte*

The European Community, in additionto itspower within the Community, may negotiate and conclude agreements with states and other international organizations. In his article, Mr. van Houtte examines the
Communir's utilization of its treaty-makingpowers under community law
as well as under internationallaw. He concludes that the Community will
attainfull internationalstatus when it utilizes its treay-makingpower completely andassumesfull and exclusive responsibilityfor it
INTRODUCTION

Since its creation, the European Community, comprised of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic
Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community or
Euratom (EAEC), not only has organized the internal common market,

but also has become the center of an international treaty network.
Agreements covering a variety of subject matters have linked the Com-

munity with a multitude of countries and international organizations.
The Community has concluded conventions both with Member States

and with third countries to establish diplomatic relations and to obtain
privileges and immunities for its institutions and agents.' It has en* Professor of International Law, Catholic University of Leuven (Belgium); Concannon Professor of International Law 1981-82, University of Notre Dame; Dr. Jur., Lic. European Law;
LL.M., Harvard University; Diploma, Hague Academy of International Law.
I For a discussion of the relations between the Community and international organizations,
see COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS (1977). With respect to the relations
between the Community and Member States, see W. GANSCHOF VAN DER MEERSCH, DROIT DES
COMMUNAUTts EUROPLENNES (1969). For a discussion of the Community's relations with third
countries, e-g., the agreement on the recognition of a CEE laissez-passer by Switzerland (Dec. 5,
1975), see 6 RECUEIL DES AccoRDs CONCLUS PAR LES COMMUNAUTts EUROPAENNE 301.
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tered into bilateral trade agreements with approximately thirty European, American, African and Asian countries, covering a broad range
of subject matters, including tariffs and tariff preferences, commodity
trade, commercial cooperation, export restrictions, free trade and custom unions. 2 Furthermore, roughly fifteen association agreements
have created still more extensive and stable links between the Community and third countries. Most of these agreements associate individual
countries with the Community. The Lom6 Convention, however, associates sixty-one African, Caribbean and Pacific developing countries
(the so-called "ACP" states) with the Community? In addition to providing for commercial, industrial, agricultural, financial and technical
cooperation, this Convention protects the export earnings and the mineral production of the ACP states. Moreover, the Community signed a
number of multilateral treaties that emanated from international conferences in which it participated. It thus became a party to several
commodity agreements4 and GATT agreements.' Community agreements are not, however, restricted to commercial matters; the Community is also a party to conventions on the peaceful use of nuclear
energy,6 on fishing rights and agricultural matters,7 on environmental
2 See C. FLAESCH-MOUGIN, Las AccoRDs EXTERNES DE LA CEE 24-33, 196-215 (1979).

3 Second ACP-EEC Convention, signed at Lom6, Oct. 31, 1979, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
347) 2 (1980). Lom6 II replaced both the Yaound6 and Lom6 I association agreements. See
Simmonds, The SecondLomb Convention: The Innovative Features, 17 COMM. MKT. L. Rav. 415
(1980). The Lom6 II Convention was signed by fifty-eight countries. Since the signing of the
Lom6 II Convention, Saint Vincent, Vanuata and Zimbabwe have adhered to it.
4 See, e.g., the agreements on cocoa, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 313) 3 (1981) (International
Cocoa Agreement of 1980); the agreements on coffee, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 309) 30 (1976)
(International Coffee Agreement), 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 248) 10 (1979) (Council Decision
of Sept. 25, 1979 on the notification of the Community's intention to continue to participate in the
International Coffee Agreement); the agreements on natural rubber, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
213) (1980) (International Natural Rubber Agreement of 1979), 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 259)
30 (1980) (Council Decision of Sept. 23, 1980 on the application of the International Natural
Rubber Agreement); the agreement on olive oil, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 327) 2 (1979) (International Olive Oil Agreement of 1979); the agreements on textiles, 17 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L
118) 1 (1974) (Council Decision of March 21, 1974 concluding the Arrangement regarding International Trade in Textiles), 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 348) 59 (1977) (Council Decision of Dec.
20, 1977 concerning the Protocol extending the Arrangement regarding international trade in textiles); the agreement on tin, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 10) 11 (1979) (Council Decision of Dec.
18, 1978 concluding the Fifth International Tin Agreement); and the agreements on wheat, 22 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 152) 7 (1979) (Council Decision of June 12, 1979 concerning the International
Wheat Agreement of 1971), 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 155) 1 (1981) (Council Decision of May
12, 1980 on the Protocols extending the International Wheat Agreement of 1971).
5 After the Tokyo Round, the Community signed twelve GATT agreements. See 21 OJ.
EUR. Comm. (No. L 71) 1 (1980) (Council Decision of Dec. 10, 1979 concluding the Multilateral
Agreements resulting from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations).
6 See, e.g., the agreement for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy concluded
with Brazil, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 79) 7 (1969).
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pollution,8 and on nuclear and health research. 9
The Community's treaty-making powers often have been analyzed
from within the Community. Community agreements are regarded as
a logical complement of the Community's internal activities, as a consecration of the Community's international status and as a necessary
instrument for a common foreign policy. The precise allocation of
treaty-making power between the Community and the Member States
has been much discussed. Also the subject of discussion has been the
allocation of treaty-making power within the Community itself as between the Commission, which has to negotiate an agreement, and the
Council of Ministers, which has to conclude it. These constitutional
deliberations continue.10
The Community's treaty-making power, however, should also be
examined under international law. Indeed, at first glance, the allocation of treaty-making power by Community law does not affect states
and international organizations not subject to Community law that negotiate or conclude an agreement with the Community. For them, international law, not Community law, should determine whether the
Community can validly conclude such agreement. Yet, as will be
7 See, ag., the agreements on fisheries with Canada, Norway and Sweden, 23 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 226) 2, 48, 52 (1980); with the United States, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 141) 2
(1977); and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 227) 22

(1981).
8 See, e.g., the Barcelona Mediterranean pollution agreement, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L
240) 3 (1977); the convention for the protection of the Rhine against chemical pollution, 20 O.J.
EuR. COMM. (No. L 240) 76 (1977); the agreements on a concerted action project in the field of
physico-chemical behavior of atmospheric pollutants, 23 O.L EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 19 (1980);
the agreement in the field of organic micro-pollutants in water, 23 0.3. EuR. COMM. (No. L 39) 25
(1980); the Convention on long range transboundary air pollution, 24 O.3. EuR. COMM. (No. L
171) 13 (1981); and the Protocol concerning cooperation in combating pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by oil and other harmful substances in case of emergency, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
162) 6 (1981).
9 For the nuclear research agreements concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, see Dauses, Die Beteiligung der Europdiischen Gemeinschaften an multilateralen Vlkerrechtstibereinkommen, 14 EUROPARECHT 138, 139 (1979). The Community has also entered into
agreements for cooperation in the field of thermo-nuclear fusion and plasma physics with Spain,
23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 190) 24 (1980); Sweden, 19 O.L EuR. COMM. (No. L 162) 28 (1976);
and Switzerland, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 242) 2 (1978).
10 See, eg., C. FLAESCH-MOUGIN, supra note 2, at 41-53 for a discussion of the legal, political
and economic motivation for Community agreements. See also C. HELD, LES AccoRDs INTERNATIONAUX CONCLUS PAR LA COMMUNAUTP ]CONOMIQUE EUROPIlENNE (1977); H. KROCK,
V6LKERRECHTLICHE VERTRXGE IM RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN (1977); and

Simmonds, The Evolution of the ExternalRelationLaw of the European Economic Community, 28
INft COMP. L.Q. 644-68 (1979) for a legal analysis of Community agreements. For a broader
discussion of the Community's treaty-making power, see Wellenstein, Twenty-five Years of European Community External Relations, 16 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 407 (1979).
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demonstrated in Part 1,11 international law leaves it to the Community
to define the scope of its treaty-making power. Therefore, Community
rules on treaty-making powers are also relevant to its negotiation partners. 12 These partners, however, are not strictly bound by the Community rules since international law takes a lenient attitude towards
agreements ultra vires, ie., concluded by the Community without
treaty-making power. 3 Part II' describes how the Community in fact
allows Member States, whenever necessary, to become parties to agreements which are within the Community's treaty-making powers. Member States thus may join the Community as parties to "mixed
agreements"' 5 or they can even act as a party instead of the Community. 6 From Parts I and II it will become clear that treaty responsibility is not related to treaty-making power.
I.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMUNITY

TREATY-MAKING POWER

Each specific legal system determines which subjects can validly
act within that system. Consequently, international law-and not community law--determines whether the Community's agreements are
valid under international law. States have been the traditional actors
in the international system. Now, however, it has become generally
accepted that international organizations also are subjects of international law and can conclude agreements. Since such agreements are
rather recent phenomena, they were not a well-developed aspect of international law until the mid-seventies. During that period the International Law Commission started to draft a convention on treaties
concluded between states and international organizations or between
international organizations. 7 The Community's agreements shall be
tested hereafter under the clauses of the draft convention, which apply
the rules of international law to an organization's treaty-making power.
11
12
13
14

See
See
See
See

notes
notes
notes
notes

17-74 and accompanying text infra.
18-60 and accompanying text infra.
61-74 and accompanying text infra.
75-103 and accompanying text infra.

15 See notes 75-92 and accompanying text infra.

16 See notes 92-103 and accompanying text infra.
17 Question of Treaties concluded between States or InternationalOrganizationsor between two
or more InternationalOrganizations, [1979] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 137 [hereinafter cited as ILC
draft]. Prior to this draft convention, agreements by international organizations had been examined by a number of authors. See, e.g., Reuter, Le Droit des Trait&s et les Accords Internationaux conclus par les OrganisationsInternationales, I MISCELLANEA W.J. GANSHOF VAN DER
MEERSCH 195 (1972); AGREEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (K. Zemanek ed. 1971).
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A.

Scope of the Community's Treaty-Making Power

Whereas states enjoy full treaty-making power,1 8 international organizations only have the treaty-making power necessary to realize
their specific tasks. 9 Each organization's treaty-making power is thus
determined by the scope of the organization itself. As set out in the

ILC draft, "The capacity of an international organization to conclude
treaties is governed by the relevant rules of that organization." 2

Con-

sequently, international law leaves it to the Community to determine
its own treaty-making power. Article 2 of the ILC draft then defines

"the relevant rules of an organization" that determine its treaty-making
power, as "the constituent instruments, relevant decisions and resolutions and established practice of the organization."'" Hence, the Com-

munity's treaty-making powers are determined by the Community
Charters, te., the Treaty of Paris for the ECSC and the two Treaties of

Rome for the EEC and Euratom,22 along with the rules and practice of
its Commission and Council of Ministers, as well as by the decisions of

its Court of Justice.
The Community's jurisdiction to enter into international agreements is primarily based on its Charters. The ECSC and Euratom treaties grant those organizations overall power to conclude any agreement
necessary to fulfill their tasks.23 The EEC Treaty, on the other hand,
grants the EEC treaty-making power only in the following areas: com18 United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, at art. 6, U.N. Doc.A/CONF. 39/11
(1969) (Vienna Convention).
19 The International Court of Justice has confirmed the functional rights and duties of international organizations. As early as 1949, the Court had recognized that "[w]hereas a State possesses
the totality of international rights and duties, recognized by international law, the rights and duties of an.. .[o]rganization must depend upon its purposes and functions as specified or implied
in its constituent documents and developed in practice." Advisory Opinion on Reparation for
Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174, 180. Although the Court
of Justice formulated the principle with regard to the United Nations, it may be extended to all
international organizations.
20 ILC Draft, .upra note 17, at art. 6.
21 ILC Draft, .upra note 17, at art. 2.
22 Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 (enteredinforce July 23, 1952) [hereinafter cited as ECSC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (enteredinforce
Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom), Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 169 (enteredinforce Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter
cited as Euratom Treaty].
23 For the European Coal and Steel Community, for example, see ECSC Treaty, supra note
22, at arts. 6, 93-94; Hallier, Die Vertragschliessungsbefugnisder Europiiischen Gemeinshafftr
KShle und Stahl, 17 ZEITSCHR. AUSL. OFF. RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 428, 442-43 (1956); G.
L6RCHER, DER ABSCHLUSS V6LKERRECHTLICHER VERTRAGE NACH DEM RECHT DER
EUROPISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 71 (1965); H. REICHARDT, AUSWXRTIGE BEZIEHUNGEN DER
EuRoPXisCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT FUR KOHLE UND STAHL ZU DRrTTSTAATEN UND INTERNATIO-
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mercial and customs agreements, 24 agreements for cooperation with
other international organizations,2 5 and association agreements. 26 Arti-

cle 7(2) of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities grants the Community the power to conclude agreements concerning travel documents
issued by the Community.2 7
Initially, the EEC was deemed to -have only the treaty-making
powers the EEC Treaty expressly granted.2 8 In practice, however, the
EEC did not limit itself to a strict reading of the EEC Treaty and concluded all agreements which came within its normal attribution.
The Community has interpreted Article 210 of the EEC Treaty as
not only granting it an international legal personality, but also enabling
it to conclude diplomatic agreements.2 9 Additionally, the Community
broadened the scope of Article 113, giving the EEC treaty-making
power necessary to conduct a common commercial policy. Article
113,30 which particularly referred to agreements on tariff and trade, on
uniformity in measures of liberalization, on export policy and on countervailing measures, has also been invoked to regulate the market and
prices of certain commodities through commodity agreements, to secure import of certain goods, and to restrict the import of others by
agreement. 3 ' Moreover, although Article 113 initially was not conNALE ORGANIZATIONEN (1961). For Euratom, see Euratom Treaty, supra note 22, at arts. 2(h), 10,
29, 73, 199-201, 206.
24 EEC Treaty, supra note 22, at art. 113.
25 Id at arts. 229-31.
26 Id at art. 238.
27 Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the European Economic Community, Apr. 17,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 140.
28 See, e.g., C. FLAESCH-MOUGIN, spra note 2 at 129-30; Pescatore, Les Relations Exterieures
des Communauths Europvennes, [1961] ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNA'TIONAL-RECUEIL DES

COURS I (vol. II).
29 W. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH, supra note 1 at 344, 347; H. SMiT & P. HERZOG, THE
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 210.06 (1976).

30 EEC Treaty, supra note 22, at art. 113.
31 See, e.g., the agreement guaranteeing Indian sugar exports, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
190) 36 (1975); the agreements to restrict the importation of textiles with Argentina, 22 O.J. EUR.

COMM. (No. L 298) 2 (1979); with Bangladesh, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 298) 39 (1979); with
Brazil, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 2 (1980); with Columbia, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 273)
2 (1981); with Egypt, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 273) 40 (1981); with Guatemala, 22 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (NO. L 350) 2 (1979); with Haiti, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 68 (1980); with Hong
Kong, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 95) 2 (1980); with Hungary, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (NO. L 332)
40 (1981); with India, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 273) 77 (1981); with Indonesia, 22 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 350) 28 (1979); with Korea, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 298) 68 (1979); with
Macao, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 298) 107 (1979); with Malaysia, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
332) 2 (1981); with Pakistan, 22 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 298) 144 (1979); with Peru, 22 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 350) 60 (1979); with the Philippines, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 371) 2 (1980); with
Romania, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 273) 116 (1981); with Singapore, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (NO.
L 350) 100 (1979); with Sri Lanka, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 298) 185 (1979); with Thailand, 22

626
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ceived to cover agreements on subject matters where no harmonization
between the Community and third countries was envisaged, such as
antitrust, Article 113 agreements nevertheless include antitrust provisions.32 While Article 113 originally was thought to cover mere trade,
it now also covers technical and commercial cooperation and even food
relief 3 According to the letter of the treaty, Article 113 agreements
differ considerably from Article 238 association agreements. First,
while the former are restricted to trade, the latter cover a broader range
of subjects, including, for example, technical cooperation.34 Second,
the Council needs unanimity to conclude association agreements, 35
whereas a qualified majority is sufficient for Article 113 agreements.36
Nevertheless, these differences have disappeared in practice.
At present, the distinction between an association agreement and
an Article 113 agreement on the basis of their subject matter has become extremely vague. Association agreements mainly focus on trade
issues while Article 113 agreements are no longer limited to trade matters.37 Moreover, the Commission and the Council proceed upon the
same principles to negotiate and conclude agreements without distinguishing as to whether the agreement is based on Article 113 or Article
238.38 The Community's choice between association and Article 113
OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 298) 224 (1979); with Uruguay, 23 O.J. Eu,. COMM. (No. L 70) 39
(1980); with Yugoslavia 24 O.. EUR. COMM. (No. L 273) 162 (1981).
32 Compare H. KRUcK, supra note 10, at 49, and Pescatore, supra note 15, at 85 with the
agreements with Austria, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 300) 2 (1972) (art. 23); with Finland, 16 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 334) 13 (1973) (Information concerning the date of entry into force of the
Agreement with Finland); with Israel, 18 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 136) 3 (1975) (art. 13), 18 O.J.
EUR. CoMM. (No. L 165) 1 (1975) (Regulation No. 1625/75 of the Council of June 26, 1975 on the
safeguard measures in the Agreement with Israel); with Norway, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 171)
2 (1973) (art. 23); with Portugal, 15 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 301) 165 (1972) (art. 26); with Spain,
13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 182) 2 (1970) (art. 9); with Sweden, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 300)
97 (1972) (art. 23); and the agreements with Switzerland, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 300) 189
(1972) (art. 23).
33 Compare Bleckmann, Dergemischte ertragim Europarecht, 11 EUROPARECHT 301 (1976)
with the agreements with Argentina, 14 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 249) 19 (1971); with Brazil, 17
OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 102) 24 (1974); with China, 21 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 123) 2 (1978), 21
OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 143) 28 (1978) (Information concerning the entry into force of the Trade
Agreement with China); and with Mexico, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 247) 11 (1975), 18 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 262) 35 (1975) (Entry into force of the Agreement with Mexico). See also the
agreement with the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine Refugees,
19 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. L 203) 44 (1976), 19 O.J. EuP,. COMM. (No. L 249) 14 (1976) (Information concerning the signing of the Convention with the UNRWA).
34 EEC Treaty supra note 22, at arts. 113, 238.
35 Id
36 Id at art. 113.
37 C. FLAEsCH-MOUGIN, supra note 2, at 104-14.
38 Id at 54, 65-69, 74-82, 103-22.
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agreements instead has a political importance: where an Article 238
association is politically less opportune, as was, for example, the case
with Franco's Spain, with Israel, Egypt or Lebanon, the Community
39
only concluded Article 113 trade agreements.

The Court of Justice, which generally takes an expansive view of
Community treaty-making powers in order to avoid its "surrender of

the independence of action in its external relations,"4 specifically sup-

ported a broad interpretation of Article 113. In its Opinion, 1/75 on
the OECD Local Cost Understanding, 4 ' the Court had to consider
whether export credits were included in the commercial policy,
notwithstanding Article 113's silence on the matter. The Court provided a broad interpretation of the concept of "commercial policy." It
stated that these terms could not be construed more narrowly when
they concern the Community's commercial policy than when they concern a state's policy. Therefore commercial policy included both export policy and credits.4" In its Opinion 1/78 on the International
Agreement on Natural Rubber,4 3 the Court indicated that Article 113
could cover any agreement that fundamentally aims at a change in the
terms of international trade (such as the rubber agreement), even when
individual clauses of a subsidiary or an ancillary nature do not enter
within the scope of Article 113.44
The Community already has implied treaty-making powers with
respect to matters for which the EEC Treaty did not grant express
treaty-making powers, because it considers implied external powers as
the necessary complement to the effective use of express internal powers. The Community thus has deemed that Articles 43, 75, and 84,
which require the regulation of agriculture and transportation within
the Common Market, provided, for example, sufficient authority for a
fisheries agreement with the United States, 45 for treaties on European
39 Id at 123-28.
40 Opinion 1/76 given pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, [19771 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 741, 758, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 279, 298 (Draft Agreement establishing a European
laying-up fund for inland waterway vessels).
41 Opinion 1/75 given pursuant to Article 228 of the EEC Treaty, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1355, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 85.
42 Id at 1362, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 91. See Kapteyn, The Common CommercialPolicy
of the EuropeanEconomic Community, 11 TFx.INT'L L.J. 485 (1976); Maas, The ExternalPowers
ofthe EEC with regardto Commercial Policy, [1976] COMM. MKT. L. REv. 379.
43 Opinion 1/78 given pursuant to the Second Subparagraph of Article 228(l) of the EEC
Treaty, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2871, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 639.
44 Id at 2912, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 676.
45 Agreement with the United States, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 141) 2 (1977). See also
Raux, Les 4ccords Externes de la CEE, 14 REv. TRIM. DROIT EUROPAEN 431, 462 (1978).
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road transportation,46 and for multilateral maritime liner Codes.47
Furthermore, it could find implied treaty-making powers in other
treaty articles as well.4 8
The Court of Justice has repeatedly confirmed the principle that
the Community's internal regulating powers can be projected into implied treaty-making powers. Its epoch-making ERTA decision of
March 31, 197 14 concerned the conclusion of the European Road

Transport Agreement (ERTA) which the Member States were negotiating with other European states."

During the course of these negotia-

tions, the Community decided to regulate internally road
transportation. As the Community gave concrete shape to the common
transport policy, it also claimed treaty-making power in this field; the
Community, and not the Member States, should henceforth negotiate
the ERTA agreements.5 The Court confirmed this view: each time the

Community adopts common rules to implement a policy envisaged by
the EEC Treaty, "the Community alone is in a position to assume and

carry out contractual obligations towards third countries affecting the
whole sphere of application of the Community legal system."'5 2 In
other words, as soon as the Community has regulated for the Common

Market a matter provided for by the treaty, it also has pre-empted the
treaty-making power in that field. "The system of internal Community
measures may not therefore be separated from that of external

relations."53

The ERTA principle has been restated and in some aspects devel46 See note 53 infra;Raux & Flaesch-Mougin, Les.4ccordsExternes de la CEE, 11 REv. TRIM.
DROrr EUROPAEN 227, 238 (1975).
47 Carriage of goods by the sea, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 91) 2 (1973); Proposal concerning
a Convention on a conduct for liner conferences, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 35) 3 (1978). See
also Dauses, supra note 9, at 168. The Member States, and not the Community, finally entered
into this agreement. See note 96 infra.
48 See H. KROCK, supra note 10, at 71-92.
49 Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities,
[1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335.
50 The European agreement concerning European Road Transport (ERTA) was signed on
Jan. 19, 1962 in Geneva. The agreement has not entered into force due to an insufficient number
of ratifications.
51 [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 269-71 (submissions and arguments of the parties).
52 Id at 274, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 355.
53 Id at 264, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 335. See generally Collinson, The Foreign Relations
Powers of the European Communities: 4 Comment on Commission v. Council, 23 STAN. L. REV.
956 (1971); Kovar, Laffairede L'.E.T devant la Cour de Justicedes CommunautbsEuropbennes
et la compisence.Internationalede la CEE, 17 ANN. FR. Daorr INT'L L. 386 (1971). It is uncertain
whether the ERTA case implies that not only Community decisions, but also directives or even
informal declarations suffice to actualize the Community's pre-emption in the domestic and consequently in the external field. See Dauses, supra note 9, at 146.
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oped and refined by later decisions. 4 In Opinion 1/76,15 for example,
the Court of Justice confirmed the ERTA principle: "Authority to
enter into international commitments may not only arise from an express attribution by the treaty, but equally may flow from its provisions."' 56 This case concerned an agreement on transport on inland
waterways, a matter the Community had not yet regulated within the
Common Market. The Court stated that the Community's treaty-making power covered not only matters already regulated within the Common Market, but also matters within its virtual capacity to regulate, but
not yet covered by internal measures. 7 The ERTA rule, as refined by
Opinion 1/76, thus has enlarged the scope of the Community's treatymaking powers so much, that it now equals the scope of the Common
Market itself. At present, however, the Community seldom makes use
of these large treaty-making powers because it fears opposition from
the Member States to such extensive Community powers, since the expansion of these Community powers reduces the individual Member
States' international capacity. The Community, therefore, prefers as
much as possible to base its treaty-making powers upon the specific
provisions of Articles 113 and 238.
Recently, the Community has looked for a subsidiary source of
treaty-making power when Articles 113 and 238 do not provide a sufficient basis. According to Article 235, on the proposal of the Commission, a unanimous Council can grant itself the power to act whenever
necessary to achieve an objective of the Community, even though not
provided for by the EEC Treaty.5 8 Commission and Council already
have used Article 235 to enlarge their treaty-making powers beyond
what they considered to be the original scope of the EEC Treaty. 9 In
54 Officer of Justice v. Kramer, [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1297, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
440 (joint cases 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76); Opinion 1/75, note 41 supra; Opinion 1/76, note 40 supra.
With respect to Opinion 1/76, see Groux, Le Parallelismedes CompVences Interneset Externes de
la Communautes Europeennes, [1978] CAHIERS DE DROIT EUROPLEN 3 and Philip, .4propos de
I'avis 1/76 de la Cour de Justice des Communautis Europtennes, 21 REV. MARCHA COMMuN. 55
(1978).
55 Opinion 1/76, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 741, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 279.
56 Id at 755, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 295.
57 Id
58 EEC Treaty, supra note 22, at art. 235.
59 See, e.g., the commercial cooperation agreement with Canada, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
260) 23 (1976); with India, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 328) 5 (1981); with the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 108) 56
(1980); and the cooperation agreement with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 144) 2 (1980). For criticism of the use of Article 235, see 0.
JACOT-GUILLARMOD, DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE ET DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 32 (1979).

The Rhine pollution agreements, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 240) 76, 87 (1977), were based solely
on Article 235. See 0. JACOT-GUILLARMOD, supra at 77, for criticism of this approach.
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addition, the Community has recently implied additional treaty-making authority by looking to the purpose of the EEC Treaty. The Com-

munity thus has based its treaty-making power solely upon the treaty
itself,6 0 even while expanding its authority beyond the literal wording.
B.

Treaties Concluded by the Community

The Community not only exercises its expressly granted treatymaking powers but it also assumes powers beyond the original concepts
of the treaties. Therefore to protect themselves, states and international

organizations negotiating agreements with the Commission, can request that the latter ask the Court of Justice to confirm the Commu-

nity's treaty-making power for the agreement involved. 6 ' As stated
above,6 2 each international organization determines its own treatymaking power. Within the Community, the Court of Justice has the
last word in the interpretation of the Charter, and consequently, on the

extent of the Community's treaty-making powers based upon the Charter. Therefore, a Court of Justice decision on the Community's treatymaking powers binds the Community as well as third parties.
There is, however, always a risk that the Community negotiated
and concluded an agreement without the necessary powers, ie., ultra
vires. 63 Initially, Community agreements found to be ultra vires were
denied any binding force. Such a strict ultra vires rule, however, became highly impractical for third parties after the theory of implied or
deduced powers blurred the limits of the Community's treaty-making
a
powers. Consequently, the ultra vires rule has been softened.r
60 See, e.g., the agreements with Austria, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 188) 2 (1975) and with
the Bank for International Settlement, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 316) 22 (1978). See generall
Raux, supra note 45, at 666. For political reasons, no association-agreement could be concluded
with Yugoslavia. Hence, the agreement is based upon the treaty in general. This agreement,
signed on April 2, 1980, is not yet published.
61 Opinion 1/75 was requested to avoid challenges to the treaty-making powers "for all interested parties, including third countries.' Opinion of the Court Given Pursuant to Article 228 of
the EEC Treaty of 11 November 1975, [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1355, 1361, [1976] 1 Comm.
MkL L.R. 85, 90. Cf.note 42 supra.
62 See notes 18-60 and accompanying text supra.
63 For example, since the Community has no power to conclude agreements which further
aims beyond its scope, it has no power to exchange tariff reductions for the right to establish in a
third country, as that power still belongs to the competence of the Member States. Bleckmann,
Die Kompetenz der Europi~ischen Gemeinschaft zum Abschlub vVlkerrechtlicher Vertrige, 12
EUROPARECHT 109, 112 (1977).
64 See Bothe, Die Stellung der Europaiischen Gemeinschaften im Vilkerrecht, [1977] ZA6RV
122, 136-37; Geiger, Aussenbeziehungen derEuropi;ischemGemeinschaft undauswiarligeGewalt der
Mitgliedstaaten, [1977] ZARV 640, 650; KROCK supra note 10, at 147; Meessen, Das Abkommen
von Lomb als gemischter Vertrag, 15 EuRoPARtcHT 36, 37 (1980).
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The Community cannot just reject any agreement which is ultra
vires. Indeed, as the International Law Commission put it, the Community "may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a
treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest. '65 The ultra vires rule manifests itself and only
operates when the lack of treaty-making power "is or ought to be
within the cognizance of any contracting state or any other contracting
organization." 6 6 Therefore, the parties entering into an agreement with
the Community have a duty to exercise reasonable diligence to determine, when in doubt, whether the agreement falls within the scope of
the Community's treaty-making powers. They cannot avoid the nullity
of an agreement when they reasonably should have known that the
Community lacked the power to conclude it.6 7 Euratom, for example,
is confined to the non-military use of nuclear energy. Thus, an agreement on military use of nuclear power is manifestly ultra vires-as any
third party should know-and not binding on the Community. When,
on the other hand, the Community's lack of treaty-making power is not
manifest, the ultra vires rules may not be invoked and the Community
remains bound.
Other than agreements ultra vires, the Community is bound by the
treaty obligations it accepts. 68 It cannot refuse to perform when contrary Community rules are introduced after it has made a commitment.69 Since the Community would have concluded the agreement in
its own standing, it is internationally responsible for its non-performance.70 The Community can request from the Member States the support necessary to comply with its treaty obligations. It can even hold
Member States that do not cooperate responsible under Community
law. 7 '
Moreover, Member States may be held individually responsible by
65 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its thirty-first session, 34 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) 418-19, U.N. Doc. A/34/10 (1979), reprintedin [1979] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 152, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.1(Part 2) [hereinafter cited as Report of the
International Law Commission].
66 Id at 419, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 152.
67 Id at 420-21, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 152-53.
68 See, e.g., Ruling delivered pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 103 of the EAEC
Treaty, (Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials Facilities and Transports), [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2151, 2178-79, [1979]
1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 131, 158-59. Articles 101 and 184 imply that the EAEC assumes its obligations itself.
69 See Report of the International Law Commission, note 65 supra.
70 See Bleckmann, supra note 33 at 302.
71 EEC Treaty, note 22 supra. Article 169 reads:
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the Community's treaty-partner for violations of treaty obligations undertaken by the Community. The collectivity of Member States can be
held responsible on a subsidiary basis, ie., as members of an international organization which fails to honor its responsibility. 72 Furthermore, in the ILC draft, Article 36 was introduced which declared that
Member States:
shall observe the obligations.

. .

which arise for them from the provi-

the relevant
rules of the organization applicable at the moment of the conclusion of
the treaty provide that the states' members of the organization are bound
by the treaties concluded by it . . .73
This draft article was vehemently criticized by the Soviet participant
because it would not express a general principle of international law.
Nevertheless, it is specifically significant for the Community.7 4 Furthermore, since Article 228 of the EEC treaty binds Member States to
validly concluded Community agreements, it could be argued that
under the draft article, the Member States can be held internationally
responsible for Community treaty violations.
sions of a treaty, to which the organization is a party if ...

II.

MEMBER STATES AND COMMUNITY TREATY-MAKING POWER

A.

Mixed Agreements

Any or all of the Member States may sign third party agreements
jointly with the Community.75 The existence of such mixed agreements
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under
this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned
the opportunity to submit its observations.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by
the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Id See also Bleckmann, supra note 33, at 311; 0. JACOT-GUILLARMOD, supra note 59, at 87.
72 C. HELD, supra note 10, at 201.
73 Report of the International Law Commission, note 65 supra. Article 36 provides:
Third States which are members of an international organization shall observe the obligations, and may exercise the rights, which arise for them from the provisions of a treaty to
which that organization is a party ift
(a) the relevant rules of the organization applicable at the moment of the conclusion of
the treaty provide that the States' members of the organization are bound by the treaties
concluded by it; or
(b) the States and organization participating in the negotiation of the treaty as well as the
States' members of the organization acknowledged that the application of the treaty necessarily entails such effects.
Id
21-32); Report of the International Law Com74 See 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (session 1525
mission on the work of its thirtieth session, 33 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) 337-41, U.N. Doc. A/
33/10 (1978), reprintedin 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 134-35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/
Add.l(Part 2).
75 See Bleckmann, supra note 33, at 301-02; Dupuy, La techniquede i'accordmixteutiliskepar
les Communautls europ, enes, [1973] ANNuAIRE INSTITuT Dnorr INTERNATIONAL 259-63.
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partly can be explained by legal considerations. Indeed, when certain
subject matters of an agreement pertain to the Community's jurisdiction and others to the Member States' jurisdiction, the agreement has to
be concluded by the Community, as well as by the Member States individually.7 6 The Community participates, for example, along with the
Member States in the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, because the conservation and utilization of marine life resources
and the exploitation of sea-bed resources are matters that fall within
the scope of the Community's powers. 7 The Community, however,
tries to avoid mixed agreements as much as possible because they undermine its status as an independent treaty party. The Court of Justice
has minimized the legal need for mixed agreements. In its Opinion 1/
76,78 concerning a draft Rhine River navigational agreement between
the Community, six of the nine Member States, and Switzerland, the
Court limited the extent to which Member States can get involved in a
mixed agreement. The Court of Justice held that participation by
Member States was only legitimate for the purpose of removing legal
obstacles flowing from previous conventions binding Member States:
"The participation of these states in the agreement must be considered
as being solely for this purpose and not as necessary for the attainment
of other features of the system." Except for this special undertaking
"the legal effects of the agreement with regard to Member States result
. . from the conclusion of the latter by the Community."7 9 In its
Opinion 1/78,80 the Court of Justice further reduced the need for
mixed agreements by stating that the Community has exclusive treatymaking power once the agreement is within the scope of the Community, even though some subsidiary and ancillary clauses are outside that
scope. 8'
Some agreements are of mixed character for political reasons. On
the one hand, Community participation in international conferences
76 E.g., the Court of Justice stated that the International Agreement on Natural Rubber,
which entered within the scope of Community powers, should be a mixed agreement if the Member States had to subscribe to the financing of the rubber-stock. Opinion of the Court given pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2871, 2918, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 639, 681 (International Agreement on Natural
Rubber).
77 BUHL, The European Communities and the Law of the Sea, [1981] OCEAN DEVELOPMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

78 Opinion given pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
741, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 279 (Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for
inland waterway vessels).
79 Id, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 279.
80 [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2871, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 639.
81 Steenbergen, The Common CommercialPolicy, 17 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 229, 231-32 (1980).
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confirms its international status. Consequently, the Community often

insists on joining the Member States in conferences in which the subject is within the Community's, as well as the Member States' jurisdiction. It then signs agreements jointly with the Member States although
the Member States' signatures alone would suffice.8 2 The Community,
for example, signed the Helsinki Act jointly with the Member States.
Because the Helsinki Act is not legally binding, the significance of the
Community's signature was merely political.83 On the other hand,
Member States, demonstrating excessive nationalism, sometimes insist
on the joint signing of an agreement that is exclusively within the Community scope. Although their treaty-making power is legally transferred to the Community, occasionally the Community may accede to
such Member States' claims and tolerate the mixed character of the
agreement for reasons of political expediency.84 Finally, third parties
that do not recognize the Community's signature, or that insist on a
joint commitment of Community and Member States can obtain the
signatures under agreements concluded by the
Member States'
85
Community.
Particular problems may arise as to the responsibility of the Community and/or Member States for violations of mixed agreements.
Mixed agreements do not entail joint responsibility of Community and
Member States as is sometimes mistakenly believed. The Court of Justice made it clear that the joint signing of an agreement leaves untouched the respective responsibilities of the Member States and the
Community.8 6 It ruled that through their own ratification Member

States merely assume the obligations authorized as within their individual treaty-making power. For matters within Community jurisdiction,
however, the agreement solely enters into force by virtue of the Com82 Dauses, supra note 9, at 148.
83 The Act's nonbinding character may explain why it was never published in the Official
Journal. On the binding force of the Helsinki Act, see Kiss & Dominick, The InternationalLegal
Signftcance of the Human Rights Provisionof the Helsinki FinalAct, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNATrL L.
293, 296-303 (1980).
84 For example, the Member States requested that they conclude the Agreements on Technical
Barriers and on Trade in Civil Aircraft (Tokyo-Round), although such matters fall entirely within
the Community treaty-making power. Cf. Written Question No. 1698/79 by Mrs. Walz to the
Commission of the European Communities, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 137) 36 (1980); 23 O.J.
EUR. Comm. (No. C 105) 31 (1980).
85 Dauses, supra note 9, at 164.
86 Ruling delivered pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 103 of the EAEC Treaty, (Draft
Convention of the International Atomic Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
Facilities and Transports), [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2151, 2180-81, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
131, 160; Pescatore, External Relations in the Case-Law of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, 16 COMM. MKT. L. REv. 615, 634 (1979).
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munity's signature and binds Member States on the basis of Community law and not on the basis of their own signature on the agreement.87
The Community and Member States never have "concurrent" or "parallel" powers. 8 The Community's obligations and responsibilities
have to be separated from those of the Member States. The mixed
agreement can stipulate which obligations are undertaken by the Community and which by the Member States. The Community, however,
avoids clear partition-formulas, which forfeit future expansion of its
treaty-making powers. Such a partition clause, therefore, remains too
vague to be helpful.89 At any rate, regardless of a partition clause, the
Community's and Member States' obligations have to be allocated according to the division of treaty-making powers between them. The
fact that the Community is vested with large powers "is a domestic
question in which third parties have no need to intervene."9 Third
parties that recognize the Community as treaty partner have to accept
the distribution of treaty-making power, and consequently of eventual
treaty liability, between the Community and the Member States. They
cannot hold the Community responsible for treaty obligations that lie
beyond its treaty-making power and are assumed by the Member
States. 9 1
B. Agreements Concluded Exclusively By Member States
Some agreements, concluded by Member States before or after the
creation of the Common Market, cover matters over which the Community afterwards may claim treaty-making powers. In making such a
claim the Community asserts that it stepped into the Member States'
shoes and, as the Court of Justice declared, that "it replaced the Member States in commitments arising from the Convention . . .and is
87 Opinion given pursuant to Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, [1977] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
741, 756, [19771 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 279, 296-97 (Re the Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vessels). See also Pescatore, note 86 supra.
88 According to Pescatore, "there is no place in the system for the construction of 'concurrent'
or 'parallel' powers. In other words, whenever and so far as the matter belongs to the Community's sphere, jurisdiction over it is exclusive of any concurrent power of Member States." Pescatore, supra note 86, at 624.
89 See, e.g., Dauses, supra note 9, at 150-52; Buhl, supra note 77, at § 25 (EEC proposal for an
Article 300 in the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea).
90 [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 131.
91 Bleckmann, supra note 33, at 311. Bleckmann suggests that in mixed agreements the Community could be responsible for obligations ultra vires on condition that all Member States signed
the agreement and thus freed the Community from the limits they put on its treaty-making power
in the EEC Treaty. However as Meessen, supra note 64, at 36, points out, such exemption may not
be implied but requires the procedure provided for by Article 236 of the EEC Treaty. See C.
HELD, supra note 10, at 205.
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bound by the said commitment."92 It is the Community's position that
the transfer of powers from Member States to the Community entails a
succession of certain treaty rights and obligations in relation to third

states.93 Such succession of treaty obligations appears to conform with
international law.94 But when third states oppose the succession pro-

claimed by the Community, international law is unclear as to whether,
and to what extent, the parties

(Ze.,

Member States) remain

responsible.
Agreements concluded by Member States on matters over which
the Community afterwards claims treaty-making powers may have to

be prolonged or renewed. The Community in such instances sometimes just asserts its treaty-making power by authorizing the member

states to prolong or renew the agreement.95 Occasionally, for example,
the Community is turned down as a treaty partner by parties who do
not recognize its treaty-making power or simply prefer Member States
as treaty partners. In such cases, the Community may order the Member States to conclude the agreement on its behalf.96
In its ERTA decision, 97 the Court of Justice recognized that the
Community may delegate some treaty-making power to Member States
whenever necessary. In that case, negotiations had been started and
carried out to a considerable extent by the Member States when the

Community claimed the power to conclude the agreement. The Court
confirmed that the treaty-making powers indeed were vested in the
Community, but it did not wish to jeopardize the outcome of the nego92 Douaneagent der NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der invoerrechten en accijnzen (preliminary ruling requested by the Tariefcommissie) (Customs Agent of the Dutch Railways v. Inspector of Customs and Excise), [1975] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1439, [1976] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 167.
Just as, in the case of commitments arising from GATT, the Community has replaced the
Member States in commitments arising from the Convention of 15 December 1950 on Nomenclature for the Classification of Goods in Customs Tariffs and from the Convention of
the same date establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, and is bound by the said
commitments.
Id at 1450, 11976] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 178. See also, with regard to GATT, International Fruit
Company NV, Kooy Rotterdam NV, Velleman en Tas NV and Jan Van den Brink's Im-en Exporthandel NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit (reference for a preliminary ruling by the
College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven), [1972] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, [1975] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 1.
93 0. JACOT-GUILLARMOD, supra note 59, at 121-35; Pescatore, supra note 86, at 638.
94 See A.D. McNAiR, THE LAw oF TREATIES 629-33 (1961), for an analogy with member
states of the German Empire retaining international personality.
95 See, ag., Council Decision of Nov. 11, 1980, 23 O.J. EuP- Comm. (No. L 307) 27 (1980)
(authorizing prolongation or tacit renewal of certain Trade Agreements concluded between the
Member States and third countries).
96 Dauses, supra note 9, at 168.
97 [1971] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 335.
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tiations. Therefore, rather than require third countries to accept the
transfer of powers from Member States to the Community, the Court
decided that the Member States had to continue the negotiations and
conclude the agreement on behalf of the Community and in accordance with its policy.98
Member States undoubtedly may continue to conclude agreements
in areas in which the Community does not claim treaty-making power.
For example, they continue to conclude bilateral economic cooperation
agreements with third countries. 99 Even in these areas, however, the
Member States have to be loyal to the policy of European integration
that they have underwritten. Their treaties may be neither incompati-

ble with their Community obligations nor detrimental to the Community's future negotiating positions." ° Although the Community does
not claim the power to conclude these treaties, it may exercise a "treaty
suggesting power." It requires the Member States, for example, to conThe
sult the Community before concluding cooperation agreements.'
Member States, and not the Community, are parties to these agreements and remain responsible for them. Even when Member States
conclude agreements on behalf or under orders of the Community,
they cannot pretend that they lacked the necessary treaty-making powers. Indeed, under international law, states are presumed to have the
full capacity to conclude such agreements.' 2 The Community can be
bound by provisions of an agreement concluded by Member States
alone, only on the condition that such is the parties' intention and that
the Community expressly accepts these obligations. 103
98 id at 281-82, [1971] Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 361-62.
99 It remains unclear to what extent cooperation agreements may be concluded by Member
JACOT-GUILLARMOD, supra note 59, at 165-71; Pescatore,
supra note 86, at 628.
100 EEC Treaty, supra note 22, at art. 5. Cf. Court of Justice Opinion 1/76, [1977] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 741, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 279.
101 See, e.g., Council Decision of July 22, 1974, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 208) 23 (1974)
(establishing a consultation procedure for cooperation agreements between Member States and
third countries). See also the Proposal for a Council Decision setting up an information and
consultation procedure for relation and agreements with third countries in the field of transport by
rail, road and inland waterway, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 350) 69 (1980).
102 See note 18 supra.
103 Article 35 of the International Law Commission draft states that:

States and by the Community. See 0.

I. [Subject to Article 36,] an obligation for a third state from a provision of a treaty if
the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation
and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.
2. An obligation arises for a third international organization from a provision of a
treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the
obligation in the sphere of its activities and the third organization expressly accepts that
obligation.
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CONCLUSION

International law recognizes the Community's treaty-making powers, as defined by Community law. For the Community, these powers,
which are extensive, confirm the Community's international status. A
cleavage, however, exists between the theoretical treaty-making power
and the actual treaty conclusion. Although the Community often is a
party to international agreements, it does not make all possible use of
its treaty-making powers. Indeed, it sometimes allows Member States
to conclude agreements which in fact enter within the Community's
jurisdiction. The Community will better realize its international status
when it fully utilizes its treaty-making powers.
Undoubtedly, treaty-making powers and treaty conclusions confirm the Community's international status. Yet, another and probably
even more essential confirmation of this status is the international responsibility for the concluded agreements. The Community's and
Member States' responsibility for Community agreements has yet to be
extensively discussed. Generally, however, the Community is not exclusively responsible since the Member States also bear some parallel
or subsidiary responsibility. The Community will obtain the full international status it is entitled to, when it not only utilizes its treaty-making power completely, but also assumes full and exclusive
responsibility for that power.

3. Acceptance by a third international organization of the obligation referred to in paragraph 2 shall be governed by the relevant rules of that organization and shall be given in
writing.
Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 65, at 395, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at
144.
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